Companies receive this message from their managed IT service providers or incident response firms more and more everyday. Traditionally, nation-states were focused on hacking other nation-states; but a new reality is emerging. Nation-backed hackers (referred to as Advanced Persistent Threats or APTs) are now targeting commercial and public organizations across domains, regardless of size.
For example, APT groups are increasingly targeting outsourced IT service companies, often called managed service providers (MSPs). While MSPs have good IT network and security knowledge, most do not have the level of training and internal resources necessary to detect, stop, and remediate an attack by a nation-state ATP. As a result, ATP groups see MSPs as a low risk and high reward target; if they infiltrate an MSP’s network, they can also gain direct privileged access to all the MSP’s client’s networks.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) recently released an Insight Report that specifically warned of increased threats from nation-state Iran APT groups due to the tensions between the United States and Iran. While the recommendations are nothing revolutionary, it is important to understand why the Information Security industry often makes recommendations based on basic IT hygiene.
To illustrate this point, consider Blackpoint’s SNAP-Defense technology detecting multiple nation-state attackers – a criminal organization, APT33, and APT34 – all operating in the same organization.
- Industry: Logistical Supply Chain
- Endpoints: 5000
- Threat Actor(s): APT33, APT34, Criminal Organization
- Tools used: Dridex, POWRUNERT
To set the stage, the attack is occurring in a 5000+ device network with limited security technology and policies and Blackpoint is in the process of deploying its SNAP-Defense and NICOS technologies as well as the commercial endpoint security products Webroot and Sophos. Blackpoint’s NICOS appliance was the first to discover unusual activity; security analysts observed SSH activity and port scans that were outside the normal use case for this network.
Blackpoint’s Security Operations Center (SOC) immediately contacted the company to request they expedite the deployment of the remaining cyber security technologies (SNAP-Defense, Webroot, and Sophos). Once these technologies were fully deployed, Blackpoint’s security analysts started to observe the abuse of a legitimate Windows technology, Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), to spread Dridex. Dridex gained notoriety for its ability to steal banking credentials, but has recently evolved into a delivery mechanism for ransomware and has the ability to establish virtual networks and delete files.
Blackpoint analysts also detected LogMeIn, a commercial remote access application, being used as a persistence method in this environment. This legitimate business application allowed the attackers to maintain a foothold inside the environment even after the device is restarted. The initial findings led the Blackpoint team to believe this was the work of a Russian criminal enterprise, but after further investigation, the analysts found more command and control servers used by APT33 and APT34 along with trade-craft attributed to these groups.
The above SNAP-Defense screenshot shows an alert for a Base64 encoded PowerShell script. This script was identified as a variant of POWRUNER, a known tool in the APT34 arsenal that allows the group to send and receive commands from the control server. Other attacker tools present in the environment were keyloggers, clipboard content collectors, and device information grabbers.
Analysis revealed that APT34 was either creating a diversion by impersonating a criminal organization to allow other tools to go unnoticed, or this network was breached by both APT groups and a for-profit criminal enterprise; additional analysis indicated that it was most likely the latter.
The point of entry for these breaches is not 100% confirmed, but Blackpoint’s investigation along with investigation by other security vendors revealed it was most likely a two-pronged attack. The attack included a phishing attack with the goal of credential harvesting, and a vulnerability in an unpatched SharePoint server. Let’s look at the CISA’s Insight Report recommendations now.