Threat Pulse: 72nd Edition
Featured Incident
Caught Task-Handed
What We’re Seeing
- The Blackpoint SOC alerted to suspicious conhost and command prompt usage on a host, which traced back to two malicious scheduled tasks dating back to May 2026.
- One task abused conhost in headless mode to run an obfuscated command that repeatedly executed a payload from a user profile folder.
- The second task launched an executable from a staging directory, likely sideloading DLLs to run a RAT that beacons to attacker command and control.
What the Blackpoint SOC Did
- The Blackpoint SOC isolated the host within minutes of the alert and identified the malicious scheduled tasks.
- The Blackpoint SOC deleted the malicious scheduled tasks to remove the persistence.
Why This Matters
- Scheduled tasks and native utilities like conhost allow attackers to persist while blending into normal system activity and evading detection by traditional security tooling.
- This environment was onboarded to monitoring one day before the alerts. The SOC isolated the host within minutes, containing a suspected RAT and preventing additional access or malicious activity.
What Blackpoint Is Doing
Blackpoint Cyber has detections in place for the behaviors observed in this attack chain, including suspicious executions and persistence mechanisms.
The Blackpoint SOC provides 24/7 monitoring and response, while the Adversary Pursuit Group tracks changes in adversary behavior, campaigns, and vulnerabilities to provide intelligence that supports detection, investigation, and response.
Recommendations
- Limit scheduled task creation to privileged accounts so standard users cannot register tasks that run at logon.
- Alert on new or modified tasks, especially hidden tasks and tasks that run executables from ProgramData, AppData, or Temp.
- Treat headless conhost launching cmd.exe as suspicious, particularly with obfuscated or looping commands, and review it.
- Block or alert on executables running from ProgramData and AppData, which would also catch the legitimate-looking binary staged in ProgramData and used for DLL sideloading.
- Teach end users to confirm the source of software and files before running them, and to report anything unexpected.
BROC Weekly Snapshot
What changed. What didn’t. What matters.
Campaign Statuses
| Campaign | Trend | Status | Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rogue RMM | ↑ | Escalating | 36% |
| Fake CAPTCHA / ClickFix | – | Ongoing | 15% |
| Trojanized Installers | ↑ | Ongoing | 4% |
| SSL VPN Compromise | – | Ongoing | 2% |
In Case You Missed It
On November 11, 2026, the Blackpoint SOC responded to a surge of unauthorized ScreenConnect deployments. Attackers used Run Command on legitimate, cloud-hosted ScreenConnect instances to push rogue access clients onto managed endpoints, giving them persistent control outside the organization’s management environment. The Blackpoint APG traced the activity to SCKit, a toolkit that tries to turn a support session against the technician. Its RelayTrap component attempts a Guest-to-Host file execution tied to CVE-2026-84869, and follow-on scripts try to steal technician session cookies to push commands to other endpoints.
APG’s test against a current ScreenConnect Host client did not execute the payload or bypass the vendor patch, and no technician compromise was observed. MSPs should update clients to build 26.6.5.9742 or later, audit for unauthorized Access clients and Run Command history, and revoke sessions for any technician who connected to a suspected endpoint.
DATE PUBLISHEDNovember 17, 2026
AUTHORBlackpoint Cyber
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