RemotePanel & BoundSiphon
Summary
RemotePanel and BoundSiphon are two previously undocumented .NET malware components identified by Blackpoint’s Adversary Pursuit Group (APG). These malware components are delivered together through a single ClickFix infection chain. The chain used an obfuscated finger.exe request to retrieve commands, abused CMSTPLUA to elevate privileges, and added broad Microsoft Defender exclusions before deploying both payloads. RemotePanel provides persistent remote access and centralized control over infected systems, whereas BoundSiphon focuses on rapidly collecting credentials, browser sessions, cryptocurrency wallets, password manager data, and other high value information.
Aliases and Related Activity:
- RemotePanel and BoundSiphon were delivered together through the same ClickFix chain; RemotePanel provides persistent access while BoundSiphon handles collection.
- Artifacts including an AntiSNG routine and the -loveputin and -donbass switches may point to a Russian-speaking development or operational context but are not sufficient for attribution.
- BoundSiphon shares its BrowserKeyDecryptor and SharpInjector components, network protocol, and unusual build metadata with the we4ftg.exe stealer, indicating the same stealer codebase or building lineage.
Additional Research: For the complete technical analysis of the ClickFix delivery chain, privilege escalation and Defender tampering, RemotePanel’s persistence and remote access capabilities, and BoundSiphon’s credential and browser data theft, read RemotePanel and BoundSiphon: A Dual-Payload Toolkit for Persistent Access and Browser Theft.
Key TTPs
| Tactic | Technique | ATT&CK ID |
|---|---|---|
| Execution | User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste | T1204.004 |
| Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell | T1059.001 | |
| Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell | T1059.003 | |
| Privilege Escalation | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control | T1548.002 |
| Persistence | Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service | T1543.003 |
| Stealth | Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools | T1562.001 |
| Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service | T1036.004 | |
| Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding | T1027.001 | |
| Reflective Code Loading | T1620 | |
| Process Injection | T1055 | |
| Credential Access | Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers | T1555.003 |
| Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers | T1555.005 | |
| Steal Web Session Cookie | T1539 | |
| Discovery | System Information Discovery | T1082 |
| Collection | Data from Local System | T1005 |
| Screen Capture | T1113 | |
| Command and Control | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | T1071.001 |
| Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography | T1573.002 | |
| Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver | T1102.001 | |
| Ingress Tool Transfer | T1105 | |
| Remote Services: VNC | T1021.005 | |
| Exfiltration | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | T1041 |
Tooling & Family Links
| Tool / Family | Role |
|---|---|
| we4ftg.exe | .NET stealer documented by Socket in May 2026 (distributed via malicious NuGet packages); shares browser decryption components, injection framework, network protocol, and build metadata with BoundSiphon. |
| SharpInjector | Small native loader (x86 and x64) used by BoundSiphon to start the .NET runtime inside a Chromium process and run its App-Bound Encryption key-recovery routine. |
| W32Time watchdog | Loader and watchdog that installs the Windows Time-masquerading service and keeps RemotePanel running inside regasm.exe. |
| regasm.exe | Legitimate Microsoft .NET utility abused as the injection host for RemotePanel; excluded from Microsoft Defender during staging. |
| finger.exe | Legacy Windows utility abused in the ClickFix chain to retrieve attacker-hosted commands. |
| BNB Smart Chain resolver contract | Owner-controlled smart contract queried by RemotePanel (getDomain) to resolve its active C2 backend. |
Indicators of Compromise
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| W32Time Stage SHA-256 | 5060c8184993d5ac04701ffa2c1d30451e40a7b2dbfc084eceaabb5084704991 |
| BoundSiphon (St_vd) SHA-256 | 30f9387b6aa2dd249d93cec58786251a224faaec57673a4b8104a33a01dfe62b |
| RemotePanel (Embedded) SHA-256 | b7a5c52cedd9cd5425a7f85b8d3b4b869b805c70c7991375a2c4ab612ff7906d |
| SharpInjector x86 SHA-256 | 351f0d27d2f0105186446693eed5794419ad79d7e6e647fc2fe74dbffb25f9ad |
| SharpInjector x64 SHA-256 | a7e8c9e157d3ce37913a32aaa861b5248da4cc5288fa99a6b291524af5e3b9c6 |
| Heaven’s Gate Thunk SHA-256 | fec29bbd8e50b6635ef683f03f6e018c9627aa6362a2f167115424e50b8c1b10 |
| CMSTPLUA Output Temp File | %TEMP%\elv_<GUID>.txt |
| W32Time Watchdog Service Binary | C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management\svchost.exe |
| RemotePanel Injection Host | regasm.exe |
| W32Time Install Switch | –loveputin |
| W32Time Uninstall Switch | –donbass |
| RemotePanel Local Overrides | GHOST_HOST / GHOST_PORT / GHOST_HVNC_PORT |
| RemotePanel Build ID | MRMN_v1 |
| BoundSiphon Build ID | New-V1 |
| ClickFix Command Delivery Domain | leftsideegpeakk[.]com |
| Finger Query | dfgwertvads23@leftsideegpeakk[.]com |
| Staging Domain | cdnprog[.]b-cdn[.]net |
| Staging URL Path | /google/dead.fik |
| Staging URL Path | /google/monitor.png |
| Staging URL Path | /googleads/monitorM.png |
| Staging URL Path | /googleads/W32Time.xpg |
| Staging URL Path | /googleads/St_vd.xpg |
| BoundSiphon C2 Domain | greatgrgreeng[.]com |
| BoundSiphon Endpoints | /check and /upload |
| RemotePanel C2 IP | 193.233.75[.]7:443 |
| RemotePanel BSC Resolver Contract | 0x2A8f205C8A6616a1D34C47F6172C16b20917253C |
| RemotePanel BSC Contract Owner | 0x481983529a4f9dae46bf451cf6a2b23d7dac1fea |
Recommendations
- Train users never to paste commands into PowerShell, Command Prompt, or the Windows Run dialog when prompted by a website, CAPTCHA, support page, or browser message.
- Use Group Policy, application control, and constrained administration policies to limit unapproved PowerShell and script execution, particularly for standard users.
- Enforce Application control (WDAC, AppLocker, or equivalent) to prevent unapproved binaries and scripts from running from user-writable locations such as %TEMP%, %APPDATA%, and %ProgramData%.
- Eliminate unnecessary local administrator access, keeping users as standard users and reserving privileged access for dedicated administrative accounts.
- Use DNS and web filtering to block newly registered, uncategorized, and low-reputation domains, and limit access to public blockchain RPC infrastructure where it is not required for business operations.
- Disable or remove legacy Windows utilities such as finger.exe where they are not required for business operations.
References
- Beal, Nevan; Decker, Sam; Ursry, Andi. (2026, September 23). Blackpoint Cyber: “RemotePanel and BoundSiphon: A Dual-Payload Toolkit for Persistent Access and Browser Theft.”
Read the Full RemotePanel & BoundSiphon Research
This snapshot provides the primary hunting artifacts, techniques, and defensive recommendations. For APG’s complete analysis of the ClickFix delivery chain, CMSTPLUA privilege escalation, RemotePanel’s blockchain-based C2 resolution and remote access features, and BoundSiphon’s browser and credential collection, read the full research.
DATE PUBLISHEDNovember 20, 2026
AUTHORBlackpoint Cyber
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