RemotePanel & BoundSiphon

Threat Snapshot
RemotePanel & BoundSiphon
Threat Type RAT and Infostealer
Platform Windows
First Observed September 23, 2026
Confidence High

Summary

RemotePanel and BoundSiphon are two previously undocumented .NET malware components identified by Blackpoint’s Adversary Pursuit Group (APG). These malware components are delivered together through a single ClickFix infection chain. The chain used an obfuscated finger.exe request to retrieve commands, abused CMSTPLUA to elevate privileges, and added broad Microsoft Defender exclusions before deploying both payloads. RemotePanel provides persistent remote access and centralized control over infected systems, whereas BoundSiphon focuses on rapidly collecting credentials, browser sessions, cryptocurrency wallets, password manager data, and other high value information.

Aliases and Related Activity:

  • RemotePanel and BoundSiphon were delivered together through the same ClickFix chain; RemotePanel provides persistent access while BoundSiphon handles collection.
  • Artifacts including an AntiSNG routine and the -loveputin and -donbass switches may point to a Russian-speaking development or operational context but are not sufficient for attribution.
  • BoundSiphon shares its BrowserKeyDecryptor and SharpInjector components, network protocol, and unusual build metadata with the we4ftg.exe stealer, indicating the same stealer codebase or building lineage.

Additional Research: For the complete technical analysis of the ClickFix delivery chain, privilege escalation and Defender tampering, RemotePanel’s persistence and remote access capabilities, and BoundSiphon’s credential and browser data theft, read RemotePanel and BoundSiphon: A Dual-Payload Toolkit for Persistent Access and Browser Theft.

Key TTPs

Tactic Technique ATT&CK ID
Execution User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste T1204.004
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.003
Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control T1548.002
Persistence Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service T1543.003
Stealth Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools T1562.001
Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service T1036.004
Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding T1027.001
Reflective Code Loading T1620
Process Injection T1055
Credential Access Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers T1555.003
Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers T1555.005
Steal Web Session Cookie T1539
Discovery System Information Discovery T1082
Collection Data from Local System T1005
Screen Capture T1113
Command and Control Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1071.001
Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography T1573.002
Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver T1102.001
Ingress Tool Transfer T1105
Remote Services: VNC T1021.005
Exfiltration Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1041
Tool / Family Role
we4ftg.exe .NET stealer documented by Socket in May 2026 (distributed via malicious NuGet packages); shares browser decryption components, injection framework, network protocol, and build metadata with BoundSiphon.
SharpInjector Small native loader (x86 and x64) used by BoundSiphon to start the .NET runtime inside a Chromium process and run its App-Bound Encryption key-recovery routine.
W32Time watchdog Loader and watchdog that installs the Windows Time-masquerading service and keeps RemotePanel running inside regasm.exe.
regasm.exe Legitimate Microsoft .NET utility abused as the injection host for RemotePanel; excluded from Microsoft Defender during staging.
finger.exe Legacy Windows utility abused in the ClickFix chain to retrieve attacker-hosted commands.
BNB Smart Chain resolver contract Owner-controlled smart contract queried by RemotePanel (getDomain) to resolve its active C2 backend.

Indicators of Compromise

Type Value
W32Time Stage SHA-256 5060c8184993d5ac04701ffa2c1d30451e40a7b2dbfc084eceaabb5084704991
BoundSiphon (St_vd) SHA-256 30f9387b6aa2dd249d93cec58786251a224faaec57673a4b8104a33a01dfe62b
RemotePanel (Embedded) SHA-256 b7a5c52cedd9cd5425a7f85b8d3b4b869b805c70c7991375a2c4ab612ff7906d
SharpInjector x86 SHA-256 351f0d27d2f0105186446693eed5794419ad79d7e6e647fc2fe74dbffb25f9ad
SharpInjector x64 SHA-256 a7e8c9e157d3ce37913a32aaa861b5248da4cc5288fa99a6b291524af5e3b9c6
Heaven’s Gate Thunk SHA-256 fec29bbd8e50b6635ef683f03f6e018c9627aa6362a2f167115424e50b8c1b10
CMSTPLUA Output Temp File %TEMP%\elv_<GUID>.txt
W32Time Watchdog Service Binary C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management\svchost.exe
RemotePanel Injection Host regasm.exe
W32Time Install Switch –loveputin
W32Time Uninstall Switch –donbass
RemotePanel Local Overrides GHOST_HOST / GHOST_PORT / GHOST_HVNC_PORT
RemotePanel Build ID MRMN_v1
BoundSiphon Build ID New-V1
ClickFix Command Delivery Domain leftsideegpeakk[.]com
Finger Query dfgwertvads23@leftsideegpeakk[.]com
Staging Domain cdnprog[.]b-cdn[.]net
Staging URL Path /google/dead.fik
Staging URL Path /google/monitor.png
Staging URL Path /googleads/monitorM.png
Staging URL Path /googleads/W32Time.xpg
Staging URL Path /googleads/St_vd.xpg
BoundSiphon C2 Domain greatgrgreeng[.]com
BoundSiphon Endpoints /check and /upload
RemotePanel C2 IP 193.233.75[.]7:443
RemotePanel BSC Resolver Contract 0x2A8f205C8A6616a1D34C47F6172C16b20917253C
RemotePanel BSC Contract Owner 0x481983529a4f9dae46bf451cf6a2b23d7dac1fea

Recommendations

  • Train users never to paste commands into PowerShell, Command Prompt, or the Windows Run dialog when prompted by a website, CAPTCHA, support page, or browser message.
  • Use Group Policy, application control, and constrained administration policies to limit unapproved PowerShell and script execution, particularly for standard users.
  • Enforce Application control (WDAC, AppLocker, or equivalent) to prevent unapproved binaries and scripts from running from user-writable locations such as %TEMP%, %APPDATA%, and %ProgramData%.
  • Eliminate unnecessary local administrator access, keeping users as standard users and reserving privileged access for dedicated administrative accounts.
  • Use DNS and web filtering to block newly registered, uncategorized, and low-reputation domains, and limit access to public blockchain RPC infrastructure where it is not required for business operations.
  • Disable or remove legacy Windows utilities such as finger.exe where they are not required for business operations.

References

Read the Full RemotePanel & BoundSiphon Research

This snapshot provides the primary hunting artifacts, techniques, and defensive recommendations. For APG’s complete analysis of the ClickFix delivery chain, CMSTPLUA privilege escalation, RemotePanel’s blockchain-based C2 resolution and remote access features, and BoundSiphon’s browser and credential collection, read the full research.

Read the Full RemotePanel & BoundSiphon Research →
DATE PUBLISHEDNovember 20, 2026
AUTHORBlackpoint Cyber

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