Variola
Summary
Variola is a modular Windows implant that establishes a stable host identity and stores configuration, working controller information, cached payloads, and additional components in an encrypted local store.
Variola can turn a ClickFix infection into a much more flexible foothold, preserving context and moving functionality into other processes. It can run commands and scripts, download and execute payloads, self-update, and relocate functionality into other Windows sessions and processes.
The Blackpoint Adversary Pursuit Group (APG) assesses with moderate confidence that Variola was developed for sustained, operator-directed access with an emphasis on credential theft, session compromise, and flexible post-compromise operations, and is likely under active development.
Aliases and Related Activity:
- Delivered via a ClickFix execution chain
- Multiple related Variola builds and deployment formats were hosted in the same GitHub repository as the
shapayload. - The same repository also staged Aura Stealer 1.8.1 (
654.exe); no direct link between Aura Stealer and Variola was identified.
Additional Research: For the complete technical analysis of the intrusion chain, architecture, controller communications, component loading, and browser-focused capabilities, read Variola: From ClickFix to a Modular Implant.
Key TTPs
| Tactic | Technique | ATT&CK ID |
|---|---|---|
| Execution | User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste | T1204.004 |
| Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell | T1059.001 | |
| Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript | T1059.007 | |
| Stealth | Obfuscated Files or Information | T1027 |
| Reflective Code Loading | T1620 | |
| Process Injection | T1055 | |
| Discovery | System Information Discovery | T1082 |
| Software Discovery | T1518 | |
| Credential Access | Steal Web Session Cookie | T1539 |
| Command and Control | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | T1071.001 |
| Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography | T1573.002 | |
| Fallback Channels | T1008 | |
| Ingress Tool Transfer | T1105 |
Tooling & Family Links
| Tool / Family | Role |
|---|---|
| Sha (Rust loader) | First-stage Rust loader decoded from the GitHub-hosted sha payload; decrypts and launches a reflective loader that maps the Variola core in memory. |
| Aura Stealer 1.8.1 (x64-vm) | Separate credential-theft payload (654.exe) staged in the same GitHub repository as Variola. No direct link was identified. |
| PowerShell / Windows Terminal | Legitimate Windows utilities abused in the ClickFix chain to download and decode the sha payload. |
| NSIS installer with Python runtime | Alternate Variola deployment format (manifest12) that bundles a Python runtime to decrypt and launch the framework. |
Indicators of Compromise
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
Variola Loader (sha) SHA-256 | 82357327e965c8d1bb82b277268cecc16a428da4bab472b1a60d238331fde9cf |
| Variola Reflective Loader SHA-256 | b2b1afa2905c63921433cada66ec9bbeb473eb467bf6501fc003e313b1cf1059 |
| Variola Core DLL SHA-256 | b1b797eaecec815741d6078b698bdceb6ea1e6e75b123d9b8c1781832ffeb9f6 |
| Variola State Directory | %ProgramData%\4A-D3\ |
| Variola State Directory (fallback) | C:\Windows\Temp\4A-D3\ |
| Variola Host Identity File | %ProgramData%\4A-D3\uid.dat |
| Variola Host Identity File (fallback) | C:\Windows\Temp\4A-D3\uid.dat |
| Variola Mutex | Local\host-ensure-core |
| Variola Mutex | Local\ledger-migrate-17000 |
| Variola Component RPC Marker | CAv2 |
| Variola Browser Agent Marker | BHkReady_ |
| Variola Browser Agent Marker | BHnReady_ |
| Variola PE Section | smallpox |
| Variola PDB Path | C:\dev\bot2\client\core\cmake-build-release\core.pdb |
| Variola Developer String | I love my job & wife. My wife loves your money. Family business since 2009 |
| Variola Developer String | A thousand and one samples still nothing to call your own |
| Variola Protocol Identifiers | WALLET_THEFT_EXECUTE, MFA_THEFT_EXECUTE |
| Variola Repo Sample: cfg | 336ede8fe2d7cdee389a59c7dd891a47ae6d9514cef284f39281e30550535639 |
| Variola Repo Sample: checksum | 4d9c820da79ed29d7a9184ca2d0b6016dce38a2bd610faa67029751825f382cf |
| Variola Repo Sample: storage | 78b54ec97c6750eeb4a3c083bd487af91ef864a488b877e9cc25800d341566fb |
| Variola Repo Sample: license | 12e7b2d8882e5376cb17d4f5d522d3ddae85e55c238a41391b5682e52483a00c |
| Variola Repo Sample: kvt | 2e77b5516d136a12d374b37371a35b6e9c8d452c84a33166dc22de12b2a8ff58 |
| Variola Repo Sample: keystore | ba6b9344b2eb24c5dd85696789ce13f9c47763e026a71f9d30d6f3922b8c83eb |
| Variola Repo Sample: manifest | e25e0b0c8bfe056476b98382dd92d153be7fcba5c9a3b29df36fc7f997151a63 |
| Variola Repo Sample: manifest_ | 4a7d01c385eb3eb2983daedbb9642f16eb6dfae0ba2e56db3ae997641dc28538 |
| Variola Repo Sample: manifest12 | fa9a4ce0e4348e99097351f89b484851ef084e1873d67f79559ed9e190e8cd35 |
Aura Stealer 1.8.1 (654.exe) SHA-256 | 7a693dad6ab41916f343524b5cb2306ff79ad413df5dffba309b6d2f635c635d |
| Variola Payload Source URL | hxxps://raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/<redacted>/deploy/refs/heads/main/sha |
| Variola Controller Hostname | n[.]alox[.]one |
| Related Infrastructure (sibling sample) | 172.86.113[.]167:4333 |
| Variola HTTP Header | X-Api-Key: secret-token |
Recommendations
- Restrict unnecessary use of PowerShell and Windows Terminal, especially when launched from browsers or other user-driven processes, to reduce ClickFix execution opportunities.
- Apply application control to prevent unsigned or unapproved executables from running from temporary directories, user profile paths, and other common staging locations.
- Monitor for PowerShell or other scripting engines retrieving content from GitHub raw URLs and immediately writing or executing it.
- Hunt for Variola host artifacts, including creation or access of the
4A-D3storage directory anduid.dat, and the mutexesLocal\host-ensure-coreandLocal\ledger-migrate-17000. - Review remote memory allocation, writes, protection changes, and thread creation involving unexpected process relationships, which may indicate Variola moving into other processes or user sessions.
- Treat unexpected injection into Chromium Network Service processes, or access to
Network\Cookiesdatabase files by non-browser processes, as suspicious.
References
- Beal, Nevan; Decker, Sam; Ursry, Andi. (2026, October 15). Blackpoint Cyber: “Variola: From ClickFix to a Modular Implant.”
Read the Full Variola Research
This snapshot provides the primary hunting artifacts, techniques, and defensive recommendations. For APG’s complete analysis of Variola’s ClickFix delivery chain, encrypted state storage, command-and-control protocol, modular component architecture, and Chromium-focused capabilities, read the full research.
DATE PUBLISHEDNovember 20, 2026
AUTHORBlackpoint Cyber
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